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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






CURTIS M. HERMAN;  
AUSTIN JAMES ASSOCIATES, INC., 
                                                           Appellants, 
    
v. 
 
STEVEN J. HARMAN;  
UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK INDEMNIFICATION BOARD MEMBERS;  
KERRY L. YOUNDT; ICF INCORPORATED, LLC;  
MICHAEL F. CONSEDINE; E. CHRISTOPHER ABRUZZO;  
W. MICHAEL SMITH; E. BRUCE SHELLER; J. STEPHEN HIEBER; 
LARRY T. MORTON; NANCY MARICONDI; STEPHANIE C. WISSMAN 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-01118) 
District Judge:  Honorable James M. Munley 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 31, 2014 
 
Before:  MCKEE, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR. and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 19, 2014) 
   
 
OPINION* 
   
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 During the period relevant to this appeal, Curtis M. Herman and Austin James 
Associates, Inc. (collectively “Appellants”) were government contractors who evaluated 
claims, provided litigation support, developed strategy on major projects, and provided 
expert opinions on technical and budgetary questions for Pennsylvania’s Underground 
Storage Tank Indemnification Fund (the “Tank Fund”), a state agency that provides 
payments to owners of underground storage tanks to remediate releases of hazardous 
substances.1  Appellants challenge the dismissal of their First Amendment retaliation 
claim, which stems from the non-renewal of their contract by the Tank Fund.  We affirm 
because the speech at issue did not address a matter of public concern and thus was not 
constitutionally protected.2 
 The controversy here emanates from gasoline leaks at a station run by Leroy and 
Mary Musser.  In September 2003, the Mussers contracted with Appellants to remediate 
the site of a 1997 fuel leak.  Later that month, the Mussers and the Tank Fund reached a 
final settlement and release agreement that included a $1.208 million payment to fund 
                                              
 1 Appellants were technically subcontractors hired by ICF, Inc., the Tank Fund’s 
third party administrator responsible for investigating all Tank Fund claims.  The Tank 
Fund authorized ICF, Inc. to hire firms like Appellants’ to investigate claims and provide 
technical services.  The contractor/subcontractor distinction, however, is not pertinent to 
our analysis.  For ease of reference, we refer to Appellants as “government contractors” 
who contracted directly with the Tank Fund. 
 2 We have jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C § 1291.  Our review of a 
district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss is plenary.  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 
218, 226 (3d Cir. 2004).  Because we write for the parties, we recite only those facts 
necessary to our conclusion.  
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remediation; the Mussers distributed this payment to Appellants.  Eight years later, the 
Mussers filed another claim with the Tank Fund, ostensibly for a 1999 leak at their 
station, with an estimated additional remediation cost of approximately $1 million.  The 
Tank Fund denied the new claim, finding that it was included in the 2003 release.  The 
Mussers appealed.   
 While the Mussers technically filed the claim and appeal, Appellants actually 
funded and prosecuted them after determining that fully remediating the Mussers’ site 
was going to be significantly more expensive than provided for in their 2003 contract.  
Appellants pursued the claim despite a conflict-of-interest provision in their contract with 
the Tank Fund, which prohibited Appellants from “representation of a client in regard to 
a claim against [the Tank Fund] on a release.”3  As a result, the Tank Fund did not renew 
Appellants’ contract.   
 “In order to plead a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must 
allege: (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a 
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link 
between the constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action.”4  This 
protection shields government contractors from adverse employment actions that result 
                                              
 3 App. 182a.   
 4 Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Mitchell 
v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
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from speech on matters of public concern.5  We use a three-part test to determine whether 
speech by government contractors is constitutionally protected: (1) whether they were 
speaking as citizens rather than as public contractors discharging their contractual duties; 
(2) whether their speech “address[ed] a matter of public concern as opposed to a personal 
interest;” and (3) whether the state had “an adequate justification for treating [them] 
differently from any other member of the general public as a result of” their speech.6   
 Appellants fail the second and third parts of our test.   Speech is of public concern 
when it is “fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern 
to the community.”7  While there is, of course, a public interest in the ability of 
businesses to apply to and then appeal the decision of a state agency without 
repercussion, it is of no public concern that a contractor of that agency—whom the 
agency relies upon for litigation support and other expertise—funds and prosecutes a 
million-dollar claim against the agency on behalf of its private client.  Here, the Mussers 
could have pursued their claim without Appellants prosecuting it for them, and 
                                              
 5 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cnty., Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674-75, 
684-85 (1996). 
 6 Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 7 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 148 (1983) (no matter of public concern 
against District Attorney when employee’s complaints “did not seek to inform the public 
that the District Attorney’s office was not discharging its governmental responsibilities” 
and did not “seek to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust 
on the part of [the District Attorney] and others”); Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 187 
(3d Cir. 2009) (“[Appellant’s] assistance . . . did not involve a matter of public concern.  
Instead, his ‘speech’ during [a] disciplinary hearing related to the personal grievance of 
one student.”).   
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Appellants pleaded nothing that suggests that their speech exposed the Tank Fund as 
being run contrary to the public interest.  Moreover, the Tank Fund, a state agency that 
provides seven-figure claim payments and relies on expert opinions to make decisions 
about those claims, had ample justification for treating Appellants differently than 
members of the public by hewing to a strong conflict-of-interest policy.8 
  In sum, we conclude that while Appellants’ speech “manage[d] to brush ever so 
gently against a matter of public concern,”9 it was the private contractual concern of a 
business, which violated a sensible conflict-of-interest policy.  Accordingly, the District 
Court properly dismissed the First Amendment claim.   
                                              
 8 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) (state employers may restrict 
speech if such restriction allows them “to operate efficiently and effectively”); see also 
Piscottano v. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 277 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that avoiding actual or 
perceived conflict of interest constitutes legitimate governmental interest). 
 9 Miller v. Clinton Cnty., 544 F.3d 542, 551 (3d Cir. 2008). 
